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DEFERENCE TO FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
INTERPRETATIONS OF UNSETTLED
STATE LAW: F4CTORS, ETC.,
INC. v. PRO ARTS, INC.
Federal courts have long been presented with cases in which they
must ascertain and apply state law. This situation most often arises
when the courts exercise diversity jurisdiction to adjudicate legal
disputes between citizens of different states.' Once a federal court
determines that it must apply state law, it faces the problem of
ascertaining what that law is. In the landmark decision Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins,2 the United States Supreme Court held that federal
courts sitting in diversity must apply state law as "declared by [the
state's] Legislature in a statute or by its highest court. . .. -3 Thus,
although the Erie case established clear guidelines for federal court
ascertainment of state law already determined by statute or by a
decision of the state's supreme court, it did not instruct federal courts
how to decide questions of state law that had not yet been decided
authoritatively.4
1. Congress bestowed diversity jurisdiction on the federal courts by the Judiciary Act of
1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (1789). This jurisdiction is currently limited by the requirement that the
amount in controversy be at least $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
The traditional explanation for diversity jurisdiction is the concern that nonresidents would
be subject to the bias of local tribunals. See C. WRiHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 23, at 85 (3d ed.
1976) (citing Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall,
CJ.)). This explanation has been disputed, particularly by those who favor the abolition of
diversity jurisdiction. See, ag., Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv.:L.
REv. 483 (1928). But see Frank, Historical Barer of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 27-28 (1948) (concluding that the possibility of local prejudice cannot be
ruled out). For a general discussion of the merits of diversity jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, supra,
§ 23, at 88-92.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Id. at 78. Erie ushered out the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
under which courts had labored for over ninety years. The Swyif doctrine had established a
nebulous dichotomy between matters of "general" law, which the federal courts could find for
themselves, and matters of "local" law, in which federal courts were to defer to state decisions. At
the time of the Erie decision, the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson had been increasingly under attack.
The independent determination by the federal courts of questions of general law had not
produced the desired uniformity in the law, but had instead enabled many litigants to circumvent
state law by forum-shopping. See C. WRIGHT, supra note I, § 54, at 251-52.
4. It is not surprising that the Supreme Court did not address this issue, because the
question before the Court in Erie was not what the state law was but rather whether state law
governed at all. The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for a
determination of the state law question. 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
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The process by which federal courts are to ascertain unsettled state
law has remained largely ill-defined since Erie. Until recently, this
issue arose most frequently in cases in which federal courts were forced
to decide the degree of deference to be afforded to prior interpretations
of state law by intermediate state courts. In addressing this issue, the
United States Supreme Court has gradually moved from requiring
federal courts to follow virtually all state law decisions by state courts5
toward a more flexible approach that allows federal courts greater
scope to interpret unsettled state law.6
In the recent case of Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.,7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived the
former, highly deferential approach in a different context. It held that
a federal court of appeals' interpretation of the law of a state located
within its circuit is binding, in the absence of an authoritative state
declaration to the contrary, on federal courts in other circuits.8 This
note focuses on the reappearance of the immediate post-Ede standard
of deference in Factors, and argues that the Factors court pursued the
goal of uniformity in the application of state law among the federal
courts of appeals at the expense of the more important Erie aim that a
federal court ascertain state law in the same manner as would a court
of that state.9 The note suggests that by emphasizing intercircuit
uniformity rather than federal-state court uniformity, the Factors
holding circumvents the broader purposes of the Erie doctrine-the
deterrence of forum-shopping and the equitable administration of the
law.10 The note concludes that the Factors standard of deference is too
rigid and too arbitrary to be workable,"' and proposes a more flexible
approach to intercircuit deference that would better promote the
equitable and orderly development of state law. 12
I. FEDERAL COURT ASCERTAINMENT OF UNSETTLED STATE LAW
A. Fidelity Union Trust v. Field's Strict Standard ofDeference
The Supreme Court's decisions in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Field 3 and three other cases' 4 during the 1940 term signaled the end
5. See infra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
7. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1973 (1982),judgrment stayed, 541 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
8. For a detailed discussion of the Factors holding, see infra text accompanying notes 53-76.
9. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
13. 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
14. Six Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); West v. American Tel. &
Tel Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
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of a short post-Erie period during which federal courts exercising di-
versity jurisdiction had continued to apply general common law in the
absence of a controlling state statute or state supreme court decision.' 5
In Field the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit was bound to follow two New Jersey Court of Chancery
decisions that clearly contradicted the language of a state statute. t6
The Court stated that the chancery court had declared and applied
state law as an "organ of the State,"t 7 and that in the absence of "more
convincing evidence," the federal courts should follow its
determination.' 8
The Court based its policy of strict deference primarily on the as-
sumption that it would lead to a more uniform application of state law
in the state and federal courts. 19 Chief Justice Hughes expressed this
desire for uniformity in his Field opinion as follows: "It is inadmissible
that there should be one rule of state law for litigants in the state courts
and another rule for litigants who bring the same question before the
federal courts owing to the circumstances of diversity of citizenship. '20
When applied in practice, however, the Field court's policy of strict
deference failed to achieve this goal; instead, it produced a number of
adverse results. First, by insisting that federal judges follow all state
court decisions in near mechanical fashion, the Court effectively substi-
15. See, ag., Six Cos. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 110 F.2d 620, 626 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 311
U.S. 180 (1940); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109 F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir.), rev'd, 311 U.S.
464 (1940); Field v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 108 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 169
(1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel Co., 108 F.2d 347, 350 (6th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S. 223
(1940).
16. The Field case concerned the validity under New Jersey law of "Totten trusts." Prior to
1932 such trusts were invalid, but in 1935 the state passed four statutes permitting them. Two
vice-chancellors nonetheless declared the trusts invalid. The Third Circuit then applied the stat-
utes, and concluded that the chancery court decisions did not express the state law. Ironically,
New Jersey courts later chose to follow the Third Circuit holding rather than the chancery court
decisions upheld by the Supreme Court. See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court
and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 207 n.97 (1957).
17. 311 U.S. at 177. The New Jersey Court of Chancery was a court of original and statewide
jurisdiction. The vice-chancellors' decisions, however, would not have been binding on other
vice-chancellors or on the state's highest court. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 48, at 267.
18. 311 U.S. at 178. Although the Court did not explain what it meant by "more convincing
evidence," the opinion indicated that there was a strong presumption that the chancery court had
interpreted state law correctly and that the Third Circuit was not free to reverse the state court
holding merely because it disagreed. .d.
19. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's desire to curb the independence of federal
judges who had been openly hostile toward Erie also may have contributed to the highly deferen-
tial approach set forth in Field. See Note, The Ascertainment ofState Law in a Federal Diversity
Case, 40 IND. L.J. 541, 548 (1965).
20. 311 US. at 180.
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tuted one kind of forum-shopping for another.21 Under the Field rule,
individuals seeking to have existing state law applied would choose to
litigate in a federal forum because the federal courts could not diverge
from existing law. By contrast, individuals seeking a change in the law
would choose to litigate in a state court because only that tribunal
would be free to consider the issue fully and to hold contrary to estab-
lished law.2
A second adverse consequence of the Field policy was its constric-
tion of the role of federal judges in cases involving unsettled questions
of state law. Lower federal courts responded to Field and its compan-
ion cases by showing unwavering deference to virtually all intermediate
state court holdings, 23 including decisions that had no precedential
value within a state's court system.24 The prospect of being reversed on
appeal for not considering even the most tangential state court author-
ity prompted some federal courts to search extensively for state court
dicta before turning to their own reasoning or to sources outside state
law .5 One federal court declined jurisdiction completely when it could
not readily ascertain from state law how a state court would have de-
21. See C. WRIGHT, supra note I, § 58, at 270; Kurland, supra note 16, at 212. Under the
previous type of forum-shopping, litigants had sought the federal forum to obtain an application
different from that which a state court would apply. In contrast, forum-shoppers under Field
sought the federal forum because it would apply existing state law more predictably than the state
courts themselves. Professor Moore commented on this phenomenon: "Blind adherence would
... give state court decisions which have the effect of stare decisis in state courts, the strength of
res judicata in federal courts." IA J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309[l], at 3113 (2d ed.
1981).
22. See Kurland, supra note 16, at 212.
23. See, ag., Gettins v. United States Life Ins. Co., 221 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1955). The
court in Gettins held that it was bound by an intermediate state court decision in the absence of a
contrary holding by the Ohio Supreme Court and declined "to exercise [its] independent judg-
ment, to look to other jurisdictions, or to speculate as to what the Supreme Court of Ohio might
some day decide." Id.; see also McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Mach. Co., 214 F.2d 608, 610 (3d
Cir. 1954) (court could not hold contrary to intermediate state court decision, even when it
thought highest state court would later overrule that decision).
24. See West v. American TeL & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940). In West the Supreme Court
held that a decision of an Ohio county court of appeals was binding on a federal court, even
though the county court of appeals' decisions had little or no weight as precedent in other Ohio
state courts. Id. at 237.
25. One commentator sharply criticized the practice of regarding dicta from state court deci-
sions as binding, and described this development as substituting "stare dictis" for stare decisis.
See Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: 4 Study in Judicial Precedent II, 40 TEx. L. REv. 619, 622-23
(1962), (quoting Oliphant,A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 72 (1928) (coining the phrase
"stare decisis")).
Former Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit, referring to this expansion of the Erie
doctrine, condemned decisions that relied on "tortuous reasoning from dicta or cases not in point
... to support propositions that the courts of the state have never decided and no court in any
state is ever likely to decide." Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect: An Analysis ofIts Proper
Area and Limits, 35 A.B.A. J. 19, 83 (1949).
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cided a complex question of state law, 26 only to have the Supreme
Court reverse its decision to abstain.27
The Field policy of deference engendered bitter opposition from
federal judges who felt they were being forced to "abdicate [their] judi-
cial functions. '28 Some commentators charged that by stripping fed-
eral judges of their authority to evaluate precedent in the same manner
as state judges, the Field rule was actually depriving diversity litigants
of their basic right to a fair trial.29
26. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 134 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 320 U.S. 228 (1943)
(dismissing plaintiff's claim without prejudice to his right to proceed in state court to secure a
determination on the question of enforceability of deferred-interest coupons attached to bonds).
27. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Declining to sanction the Fifth
Circuit's abstention, the Court stated that "Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins... did not free the fed-
eral courts from deciding questions of state law in diversity cases." Id. at 237. The court con-
cluded that "i]n the absence of some recognized public policy,. . . denial of [the] opportunity [to
litigate in a federal rather than a state forum] by the federal courts merely because the answers to
the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not yet been given by the highest court
of the state, would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act." Id. at 234-35; see also Daily v.
Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945) (in absence of state court decision, duty of federal court was
to decide, and not to avoid, the question). In light of the recent growth of the abstention doctrine,
the Meredith holding may no longer represent an absolute rule. See C. WIoHT, supra note 1,
§ 58, at 270 n.29.
28. Clark, State Law in the Federal Court" The Brooding Omn/resence ofErie v. Tompkins,
55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-91 (1946)..Judge Clark stated:
IT]he current view... is that we must act as a hollow sounding board, wooden indeed,
for any state judge who cares to express himself. . . . Why should we abdicate our
judicial functions and even prostitute our intellectual capacities to discover not state law,
but the particular views a state judge may have uttered many years ago under different
circumstances?
Id See Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.) (federal judges
are not to "play the role of ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state");
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 400-
01 (1964) (referring to Field and its companion cases as "the excesses of 311 U.S."); see also Hart,
he Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rav. 489, 510 (1954) ("second-rate
justice" would result if federal courts were bound to adhere to intermediate state court decisions);
Corbin, The Law of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762, 768, 775 (1941) (A federal court "must
use its judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot.")
29. See Corbin, supra note 28, at 775. Professor Corbin asked:
Shall a litigant, by the accident of diversity of citizenship, be deprived of the advantages
of this judicial process...? We must not forget that a litigant has only one day in court.
When forced into a federal court, that is his only court. If he is denied life, liberty, or
property by the narrow syllogistic use of a state judge's worded doctrine, he is not re-
stored by the fact that intelligent state judges later refuse to apply that doctrine to other
litigants. True, he has had his day in court; but what a court!
Id See also Clark, supra note 28, at 291. Judge Clark restated Corbin's criticism ofField's rule of
deference as follows: "[A]nything short of full judicial action on the part of the federal judges is a
deprivation of the rights of the litigants to due process and a fair trial." Clark labeled Corbin's
view "the best advice and exposition of the [Ede] doctrine possible," and noted that the federal
courts' "attempted departures from that conduct are what have made the Tompkins result seem at
times bizarre and strange." Id. Framed in the context of Ede rather than due process, the Field
rule of deference could be said to have deprived diversity litigants of the best rule of decision
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B. Field's Strict Standard Relaxed
In the decades following the Field decision, the Supreme Court
showed signs of relaxing its requirement that federal courts defer to all
lower state court interpretations of unclear state law. In King v. Order
of United Commercial Travelers of America,30 decided in 1948, the
Court held that an unreported decision by a South Carolina court of
common pleas was not binding on a federal court sitting in diversity.3 1
The Court reasoned that because the court of common pleas' decision
was not binding on any state court within South Carolina, "it would be
incongruous indeed to hold a federal court bound by [the] decision. ' '32
In the 1956 case of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. ofAmerica,33 the
Supreme Court held that a 1910 Vermont state court decision was still
binding on federal courts, but indicated in dictum the kind of evidence
that might have permitted the federal court to disregard the state court
decision:
[Tihere appears to be no confusion in the Vermont decisions, no de-
veloping line of authorities that casts a shadow over the established
ones, no dicta, doubts or ambiguities in the opinions of Vermont
judges on the question, no legislative development that promises to
undermine the judicial rule.34
In its 1967 decision in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,35 the Court
appeared to abandon entirely the Field policy of strict deference, hold-
ing that an intermediate state court decision should be given "proper
regard," but was not binding authority in a federal court.3 6
under the circumstances merely because the forum was federal. See Note, Unclear State Law in
the Federal Courts: Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REv. 747, 759 (1964).
30. 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
31. Id. at 162. The Court stated that, although the unreported decision was entitled to "some
weight," it was not to be a "controlling factor" in a federal court's decision. Id.
32. Id The Court noted that because the court of common pleas' decision did not require
deference from other courts within the state, it did not fall within the West Court's definition of
"'rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior courts."' Id. at
161 (footnote omitted) (citing West v. American Tel. & TeL Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236 (1940)). As an
alternative ground for its decision, the Court cited the difficulty of obtaining the unreported deci-
sions of the court of common pleas. 333 U.S. at 161-62.
33. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
34. Id. at 205.
35. 387 U.S. 456 (1967). Bosch was not a diversity case, but involved the analogous issue of
whether a federal court or agency was bound by an intermediate state court's determination of the
property rights of the parties in a federal estate tax case.
36. Id. at 465. The Court stated:
Under some conditions, federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate
state appellate court ruling .... If there be no decision by [the state supreme] court
then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving "proper
regard" to relevant rulings of other courts of the State.
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In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in King, Bernhardt, and
Bosch, lower, federal courts facing undecided questions of state law
have increasingly looked beyond state court decisions to such sources
as restatements of the laws, 37 law review commentaries, 38 relevant deci-
sions by courts of other states and by federal courts,39 and to the gen-
eral weight of authority.40 In short, federal courts faced with questions
of unsettled state law are now free to consider all data that a state court
would use in deciding the issue.41 Partly as a result of this increased
freedom, however, a new version of an old question has emerged:42
what degree of deference should federal courts afford interpretations of
state law by other federal courts?
C. Deference Within the Federal Court System on Unsettled
Questions of State Law
The issue of federal court deference to state law interpretations by
other federal courts arises most often in the context of federal appellate
review. The Supreme Court has on occasion deferred to a lower fed-
eral court's determination of an unsettled issue of state law.43  More
frequently, federal courts of appeals afford deference on direct review
37. See, eg., Tri-Tron Int'l v. Velto, 525 F.2d 432,436 (9th Cir. 1975) (in absence of Montana
law on subject of trade secrets, district court properly turned to the Restatement of the Law of
Torts); Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483, 488-89 (2d Cir. 1971); Gates v. P.F. Collier, Inc., 378
F.2d 888, 892 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968); Glassman Constr. Co. v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 356 F.2d 340, 342 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 987 (1966).
38. See Wendt v. Lilla, 182 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Iowa 1960); see also J. MOORE, supra note
21, 1 0.309 [2], at 3124 n.21.
39. See, e-g., Gray v. Travelers Indem. Co., 280 F.2d 549, 554 n.2 (9th Cir. 1960) (court
would. look to conflicts law of Alaska in absence of determination by Washington courts); Yost v.
Morrow, 262 F.2d 826, 828 n.3 (9th Cir. 1959) (on unclear questions of Idaho law, court looked to
decisions of Idaho's sister state, Oregon); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 76 F.
Supp. 560, 564 (D. DeL 1948) (court took legal notice that Delaware courts pay particular atten-
tion to the courts of Massachusetts and New York). See also J. MOORE, supra note 21, 1 0.309 [2],
at 3123 n.19.
40. See C. WmrH, supra note 1, § 59, at 271.
41. See id § 58, at 269 ("The federal judge need no longer be a ventriloquist's dummy..
See also Friendly, .spra note 28, at 401; Vestal, Erie R.R. V. Tompkins: A Projecion, 48 IoWA L.
Rav. 248, 256 (1963).
42. If federal courts could still consider only state court decisions in deciding questions of
state law, the question whether deference must be given to the state law-rulings of other federal
courts would rarely arise.
43. In MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280 (1942), the Supreme Court
held that in the absence of any relevant state court decisions on an issue of Michigan law, it would
"leave undisturbed the interpretation placed upon purely local law by a Michigan federal judge of
long experience and of three circuit judges whose circuit includes Michigan." Id. at 281. See also
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956) (giving special weight to statement by
federal district judge from Vermont identifying Vermont law); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232, 237 (1944).
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to interpretations of state law by federal district judges.44 The ration-
ale behind such deference is that a district court judge, who sits in a
particular state and has practiced before that state's courts, can better
decide questions of unsettled state law than a circuit court judge, who
frequently lacks such experience.45
Federal courts of appeals have adopted different standards of def-
erence in reviewing district court interpretations of state law on appeal.
Many courts afford "great weight" or "considerable weight"'46 to such
decisions. Other courts consider themselves bound by district court in-
terpretations of state law unless they are "clearly erroneous." 47 As a
rule, deference has been limited to situations involving direct appellate
review. Federal courts of appeals generally have not afforded defer-
ence to decisions by federal courts in other circuits, 48 except in a few
44. See infra notes 46-47.
45. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 59, at 271.
As a general proposition, a federal court judge who sits in a particular state and has
practiced before its courts may be better able to resolve complex questions about the law
of that state than is some other federal judge who has no such personal acquaintance
with the law of the state. For this reason federal appellate courts have frequently voiced
reluctance to substitute their own view of the state law for that of the federal judge. As a
matter of judicial administration, this seems defensible.
Id.
46. See, eg., Lamb v. Amalgamated Labor Life Ins. Co., 602 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir. 1979)
(court gave great weight to conclusion of federal district court judge on questions of state law, and
was not able to say he had erred); Green v. American Broadcasting Cos., 572 F.2d 628, 632 (8th
Cir. 1978); Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383, 1385 (6th Cir. 1975);
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. English, 395 F.2d 854, 860 (5th Cir. 1968). Contra Peterson v. U-Haul
Co., 409 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1969) (federal court decisions in diversity cases have no prece-
dential value as state law and only determine the issues between the parties).
47. See, ag., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 770 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct.
1006 (1982); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1975); Sade v. Northern
Natural Gas Co., 501 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1974); Julander v. Ford Motor Co., 488 F.2d 839,
844 (10th Cir. 1973); Binkley v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 889, 891 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 877 (1973). Professor Moore argues that the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review is itself erroneous when applied to questions of law, rather than findings of fact. See J.
MooRE, supra note 21, 0.309[2], at 3128 n.28. Professor Wright agrees: "It would seem that a
party is entitled to review of the trial court's determination of state law just as he is of any other
legal question in the case, and that the decision of a local trial judge cannot reasonably be re-
garded as conclusive." C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 59, at 271.
The distinction between the "great weight" and "clearly erroneous" standards is not always
clear, particularly because some courts use the term "great weight" while apparently applying a
"clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Scandinavian Airlines v. United Aircraft, 601 F.2d 425,
427 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The analysis by the district judge of the law of the state in which he sits is
entitled to great weight and his determination will be accepted on review, unless shown to be
clearly wrong.").
48. See United States v. Dawson, 576 F.2d 656, 659 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1127
(1978) (Fifth Circuit in no way bound by decisions of other circuits); S.E.C. v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d
1301, 1306 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974); Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 429 F. Supp. 411, 413
(N.D. Ind. 1977); Ghandi v. Police Dep't, 74 F.R.D. 115, 122-23 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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cases involving the specialized areas of taxation 49 and administrative
law. 0 Until Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 51 no federal court of
appeals had deferred to a prior determination of state law made by a
federal court in another circuit.5 2
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has occasionally departed from the general prac-
tice of affording no deference among the circuits by deferring to decisions by other courts of
appeals when such decisions are not clearly wrong. The rationale behind this deference is one of
maintaining uniformity of national law. The Eighth Circuit has stated:
Although we are not bound by another circuit's decision, we adhere to the policy that a
sister circuit's reasoned decision deserves great weight and precedential value. As an
appellate court, we strive to maintain uniformity in the law among the circuits, wherever
reasoned analysis will allow, thus avoiding unnecessary burdens on the Supreme Court
docket. Unless our 11 courts of appeals are thus willing to promote a cohesive network
of national law, needless division and confusion will encourage further splintering and
the formation of otherwise unnecessary additional tiers in the framework of our national
court system.
Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980) (defer-
ring to decisions in the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits on constitutionality of state consumer
credit code provisions governing maximum finance charges); see also National Indep. Meat
Packers Ass'n v. EPA, 566 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1977); Estate of Spicknell v. Commissioner, 285
F.2d 561, 567 (8th Cir. 1961); Homan v. United States, 279 F.2d 767, 773 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 866 (1960). The Eighth Circuit's rationale for deference seems to be totally separate from
the considerations of state law expertise identified by Professor Wright, for the Eighth Circuit has
applied the rule of deference to decisions on state law interpretations by district court judges who
were from another state and who thus possessed no particular knowledge of the state law adjudi-
cated. See, e.g., St. Paul Hosp. & Casualty Co. v. Helsby, 304 F.2d 758, 759 (8th Cir. 1962);
Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916, 922 (8th Cir. 1958).
49. Some federal courts of appeals have deferred to decisions by other circuits on tax matters
in order to encourage uniformity in the tax laws. See, e.g., North Am. Life & Casualty Co. v.
Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1976) (decisions of other courts of appeals in area of
taxation should be followed, in interest of uniformity among circuits, unless they are demonstra-
bly erroneous or there are cogent reasons for rejecting them); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 527 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (7th Cir. 1975) (because respect for decisions of other circuits is
especially important in promoting uniformity in tax cases, a decision of another circuit should'be
followed unless proved incorrect); cf. Gulf Inland Corp. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1277, 1278 (5th
Cir. 1978) (courts of appeals may defer to each other in tax cases to promote uniformity, but stare
decisis does not apply).
50. Some federal courts have given great weight to decisions on administrative law matters
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit because of that court's expertise in
the administrative law area. See, e.g., City of Westfield v. Federal Power Comm'n, 551 F.2d 468
(Ist Cir. 1977) (following holding of Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that
federal courts lack jurisdiction to review Federal Power Commission's orders, because views of
that circuit carry great weight in administrative law matters). See also FTC v. Stanley H. Kaplan
Educ. Center, 433 F. Supp. 989, 993 n.l (D. Mass. 1977) (views of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit carry great weight in administrative law matters).
51. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1973 (1982),iudgment stayed, 541 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
52. In Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 352 (S.D. Tex. 1980), a district court in the
Fifth Circuit held that it was not bound by an Eighth Circuit decision concerning a matter of
Delaware law because it was not convinced that the prior decision was supported by Delaware
law. In Waters v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 363 F.2d 684, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that the Eighth Circuit's views on Mis-
souri law were entitled to weight, but rather than defer to an Eighth Circuit decision interpreting
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II. FAcToRs, ETC., INC. V PRO ARTS, INC.: A RETURN TO A
STRICT STANDARD OF DEFERENCE
A. The Reasoning of the Factors Court
In Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. ,53 a majority of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that in the absence of any defini-
tive state court statement of Tennessee law, it was bound to defer to the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Memphis
Development v. Factors, Etc., Inc. 54 that under Tennessee law55 an
individual's right of publicity is not descendible. 56 Despite a strong
Missouri law, the court decided to follow a more recent state intermediate appellate court
decision.
53. 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1973 (1982),judgment stayed, 541 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Factors, Etc., Inc., a Delaware corporation, acquired an exclusive
license to use the name and likeness of deceased singer Elvis Presley from Boxcar Enterprises,
Inc., a corporation that Presley had formed and to which he had assigned exclusive ownership of
his commercial rights. Id at 279. When Pro Arts, Inc., an Ohio corporation, marketed a poster of
Presley through various retail dealers, Factors brought suit in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York and obtained a preliminary injunction restraining Pro Arts from making any
commercial use of Presley's name or likeness. Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's issu-
ance of the injunction. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). Factors
subsequently moved for summary judgment in the case and the district court granted the motion,
issuing a permanent injunction from which Pro Arts appealed. 496 F. Siipp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision, deferring to the Sixth Circuit's prior
determination that the right of publicity was not descendible under Tennessee law. See inv/ra note
56. Pro Arts then moved for summary judgment in the district court based on the Second Circuit's
decision. Factors moved for cross-summary judgment, or alternatively, a stay of entry of judg-
ment. Factors cited as support for its motion a Tennessee chancery court decision rendered subse-
quent to Factors that held that the right of publicity was descendible under Tennessee law. See
Commerce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2204 (Tenn. Ch. 1981). See infra note
125 for a detailed discussion of the chancery court holding. On May 11, 1982, Federal District
Judge Tenney, whose original decision in the case was reversed by the Second Circuit in Factors,
granted Factors' request to stay entry ofjudgment, allowing Factors to petition the Second Circuit
for rehearing in light of Commerce Union Bank. See 541 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
54. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). In Memphis Development, a
Tennessee nonprofit corporation sought an injunction to keep Factors, Etc., Inc., from interfering
with its fund-raising promotion of Elvis Presley statuettes. The district court decided in favor of
the defendant, Factors, holding that Presley's right of publicity was descendible because, among
other reasons, the Tennessee court would follow the majority rule. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Fac-
tors, Etc., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977). The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment,
however, basing its holding that the right of publicity is not inheritable on general considerations
independent of state law. 616 F.2d at 960.
55. Factors contended for the first time on appeal that New York law, rather than Tennessee
law, was applicable. The court held that Tennessee law applied because Tennessee was the place
of Presley's domicile, of Boxcar Enterprises' incorporation, and of the signing of the agreement
between Boxcar and Factors. Moreover, the agreement specifically provided that it would be
construed in light of Tennessee law. 652 F.2d at 281.
56. 652 F.2d at 283. The court stated that in view of its disposition of the appeal, it need not
consider Pro Arts' contention that the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Development collater-
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dissent,57 the majority in Factors set forth the broad new rule that a
court of appeals' interpretation of the unsettled law of a state located
within its circuit should be given conclusive deference by other federal
courts.5 8
The Factors court based its unprecedented holding of deference to
the Sixth Circuit's decision partly on what it termed the "functioning of
diversity jurisdiction. '59 The court stated that the Sixth Circuit, "[i]n
adjudicating a state-created right in the exercise of its diversity jurisdic-
tion, . . . was 'for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the
State.'-60 Because the Sixth Circuit was "expounding upon Tennes-
see's version of the common law,"'61 its decision should be regarded as
binding although it was not based on Tennessee law62 or court meth-
ods63 and was probably contrary to the result that the Second Circuit
would have reached on the merits of the issue.64
ally estopped Factors from asserting a descendible right of publicity. Id. at 283 n.8. The dissent
did address the collateral estoppel issue, however, concluding that given the circumstances of the
case-most particularly the fact that the New York litigation was actually filed first---the policies
behind the collateral estoppel rule would not be served by using Memphis Development as a bar.
Id. at 289 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). But see Note, Federal Court's State Law Ruling Entitled to
Conclusive Deferenc" Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 974, 980-82 (re-
jecting the argument that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because action was filed first in New
York on the ground that the district court's holding was not a final judgment, and concluding that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel should have precluded consideration of the question of
deference).
57. Judge Mansfield filed a dissenting opinion in which he took issue with the majority's
reasoning, stating: "I see no warrant, if we disagree [with the Sixth Circuit] on the merits, for
blindly following its decision in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors, Etc., Inc., any more
than we would defer to the decision of any other circuit court with which we might... disagree
or conflict." 652 F.2d at 284 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
58. The Factors court expressed its surprise that "no case appears to have turned on whether
one court of appeals shall defer to another circuit as to the law of the state within that circuit."
652 F.2d at 281.
59. 652 F.2d at 282.
60. Id. at 282 (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945)). The Factors
court looked to the York strain of Ee analysis to support its holding. Under the "outcome-
determination" theory espoused by the Court in York, Erie requires the outcome of state law
issues in federal diversity cases to be "substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of litigation, as it [would] be if tried in the state court." 326 U.S. at 109. But see infra
note 86 and accompanying text.
61. 652 F.2d at 281. The court stated that the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development "had no
power 'to declare substantive rules of common law'; it could only declare the law of Tennessee."
Id. at 282 (quoting Erie R.RL Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).'
62. See infra note 73.
63. The dissenting judge in Factors, noting that the Sixth Circuit did not rely on "existent
local law or methods," stated that the Memphis Development opinion "made no effort, as is some-
times done, to determine what other states the Tennessee courts tend to look to, much less to be
guided by analogous principles of Tennessee law." 652 F.2d at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
64. 652 F.2d at 282. Judge Newman, writing for the majority, stated that he "would proba-
bly uphold a descendible right of publicity, were he serving on the Tennessee Supreme Court, and
perhaps if he served on the Sixth Circuit when Memphis Development was decided." Id The fact
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Underlying the Factors decision was the court's desire to bring
about the uniform application of unsettled state law in the federal
courts. The Factors court remarked that "sporadic federal court adju-
dications" in diversity cases had disrupted the "authoritative exposition
of state law,"'65 and stated that a policy of conclusive deference to inter-
pretations of state law by "pertinent" courts of appeals66 would en-
hance "both the orderly development of state law and fairness to those
subject to state law requirements." 67 The court reasoned that a policy
providing a single authoritative answer to previously unsettled ques-
tions of state law would promote "fairness to the public ' 68 and would
better focus state legislative efforts on the appropriateness of statutory
reform.69 The court also predicted that the uniform application of state
law in the federal courts would prompt other state courts to apply the
federal rule because of a common interest in uniformity.70
The Factors court appeared anxious to bolster its holding with the
argument that deference was warranted because the Sixth Circuit had a
special knowledge of Tennessee law. Specifically, the majority stressed
the status of the Second Circuit judges on the panel as "outsiders" 71
with respect to Tennessee law, and noted that the author of the Sixth
Circuit opinion was "a distinguished member of the Tennessee bar,
whose sense of what may be expected of the Tennessee Supreme Court
that at least one of the judges in the majority would have been inclined to decide the issue differ-
ently had the court not deferred to the Sixth Circuit decision is evidence of the unequivocal nature
of the deference afforded in Factors. In contrast, most courts that have based their decisions on
grounds of deference have also stated their agreement with the merits of the previous decision,
thus drawing into question the strength of the deference ground to such holdings.
65. 652 F.2d at 282.
66. The majority employed the term "pertinent" to identify the particular court of appeals
whose circuit's geographic boundaries encompass the state in question. Id
67. 652 F.2d at 282.
68. Id. The court rhetorically raised the following question: "If this Court were to disregard
the Sixth Circuit's view and declare that Tennessee law recognizes a descendible right of publicity,
what standard of conduct should guide Tennessee residents endeavoring to determine whether
their publicity rights are to be valued only for a lifetime or beyond?" Id. at 283.
69. Id at 282.
70. Id. & n.6. For a critical discussion of these issues, see infra notes 95-99 and accompany-
ing text.
71. The term "outsiders" with regard to state law was borrowed from the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974). In Lehman Brothers the Court reversed a
decision by the Second Circuit on an unsettled question of Florida law and remanded the case to
the district court for reconsideration of whether the issue should be certified to the Supreme Court
of Florida. The Court stated that "[w]hen federal judges in New York attempt to predict uncer-
tain Florida law, they act... as 'outsiders' lacking the common exposure to local law which
comes from sitting in the jurisdiction." Id. at 391.
Tennessee, unlike Florida, has no statute providing for certification of state law questions to
the state supreme court; thus, this option was not available to either the Sixth Circuit in Memphis
Development or the Second Circuit in Factors.
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surely surpasses our own."'7 2 Significantly, however, the Factors major-
ity expressly declined to base its holding of deference to Memphis De-
velopment on the Sixth Circuft's expertise concerning Tennessee state
law. Noting that the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Memphis Development
"emphatically disclaim[ed] any basis for predicting how Tennessee will
resolve the issue on the merits. '73 The majority stated in a footnote
that "[it] preferred to determine the authoritativeness of Memphis De-
velopment with regard to the territorial scope of the Sixth Circuit,
rather than the heritage of the opinion's author.
'74
Finally, the majority in Factors went to great lengths to lay the
groundwork for a strict standard of deference. Although the court
stopped short of concluding that determinations of unsettled state law
by pertinent circuit courts are "automatically binding" on all other fed-
eral courts, 75 it stated that federal courts should defer to such interpre-
tations "in all situations except the rare instance when it can be said
with conviction that the pertinent court of appeals has disregarded
clear signals emanating from the state's highest court pointing toward a
different rule."'76
B. Criticism of Factors
The Factors court's construction of a strict standard of intercircuit
deference contains four major flaws. First, the Factors holding of def-
erence is based not on the pertinent circuit court's expertise concerning
a particular state's law and court methods but rather on its "territorial
72. 652 F.2d at 283 n.7.
73. The Memphis Development court clearly eschewed any resort to Tennessee law, stating
that "Tennessee courts have not addressed [the] issue directly or indirectly, and we have no way to
assess their predisposition." 616 F.2d at 958. Rather, the decision denying the descendibility of
the right of publicity was made "in the light of practical and policy considerations, the treatment
of other similar rights in our legal system, the relative weight of the conflicting interests of the
parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning death, privacy, inheritability and economic
opportunity." Id In evaluating these general considerations, the Sixth Circuit relied on J. RAwLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Rev. ed. 1977). See
616 F.2d at 959.
74. 652 F.2d at 283 n.7.
75. Id at 283. The court stated that "[a] federal court in another circuit would be obliged to
disregard a state law holding by the pertinent court of appeals if persuaded that the holding had
been superseded by a later pronouncement from state legislative or judicial sources, or that prior
state court decisions had been inadvertently overlooked by the pertinent court of appeals." Id.
(citation omitted).
76. Id. The Factors court also stated its standard as follows: "[W]e should defer to the views
of the Sixth Circuit unless we can point to a clear basis in Tennessee law for predicting that the
Tennessee courts, when confronted with a case such as this, would conclude that the Sixth Cir-
cuit's prediction was incorrect." Id. (footnote omitted). See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying
text.
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scope."177 As such, the Factors reasoning differs from the sound ration-
ale on which federal courts of appeals have previously grounded their
deference to the state law interpretations of federal district court judges
on direct review.78 Faced with a Sixth Circuit decision that not only
expressly declined to predict how the Supreme Court of Tennessee
would have decided the case,79 but also summarily rejected the state
law interpretation of a federal district court judge,80 the Factors court
could not invoke the expertise rationale to support its holding of defer-
ence. Rather than examining the merits of the state law question, the
court deferred to the Memphis Development decision based upon the
apparently novel and highly questionable concept of the "territorial
scope" of the Sixth Circuit.
A pertinent circuit court panel's special familiarity with the law
and court methods of a state located within its jurisdiction arguably
renders it particularly qualified to apply the substantive state law that a
state's supreme court would apply in the same situation. 81 If this spe-
cial familiarity is of no consequence to the pertinent court's decision,
however, the mere fact that the "territorial scope" or physical bounda-
77. See supra text accompanying note 74. The court did not define what it meant by "territo-
rial scope"; the term apparently denotes simply that the state of Tennessee is located within geo-
graphical boundaries of the Sixth Circuit.
78. The deference that higher federal courts have afforded to interpretations of state law by
federal district courts is based on the district judge's familiarity with the law and legal practice of
the state in which he sits. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 73. By declining to predict how the Supreme Court of Tennessee would
have decided the issue, the Sixth Circuit failed to heed Erie's directive that a federal court should
attempt to resolve questions of state law in the same manner as the supreme court of that state.
See, eg., Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1980) (construing New
Mexico law as would the New Mexico Supreme Court); Scandinavian Airline Sys. v. United Air-
craft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1979) (in absence of definitive adjudication by California
Supreme Court, court of appeals sought to resolve issue as would the California court); Winston
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 508 F.2d 1298, 1304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975)
(court decided suretyship case under Georgia law as it thought Supreme Court of Georgia would
have done). See supra note 63.
80. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980), rev'g 441 F. Supp.
1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980). In his opinion holding that the right of
publicity is descendible under Tennessee law, District Court Judge Weliford looked both to the
majority rule on the issue of the descendibility of the right of publicity and to Tennessee decisions
in analogous areas. 441 F. Supp. at 1330. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit apparently afforded no
deference to this decision of a district judge who possessed considerable expertise in Tennessee
law. It is indeed ironic that the Factors court chose to set forth its broad rule of intercircuit
deference by deferring to a decision that itself ignored an already well-established rule of federal
appellate court deference to district court judges' interpretations of state law. See supra notes 44-
47 and accompanying text.
81. Seesupra notes 43-52 and accompanying text. In his dissent, Judge Mansfield questioned
the validity of this proposition:
Unlike a state court or a federal district court within a single state, the court of appeals of
a circuit in which several states are located, which disposes of diversity appeals as only a
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des of the circuit encompass a particular state does not render the perti-
nent court of appeals better able to interpret the law of that state than
other courts of appeals.82 Absent the key element of expertise, the Fac-
tors court's designation of pertinent circuit court interpretations of un-
settled state law as authoritative rests on no more than an arbitrary
geographical distinction.
The second flaw in the Factors court's reasoning stems from the
court's belief that the primary goal of federal courts ascertaining unset-
tled state law is to achieve absolute uniformity in the application of
state law among the federal courts, rather than to ensure that a federal
court applies the same substantive rule that a state court would apply.
The Factors court based its emphasis on the former kind of uniformity
on its understanding of the "functioning of diversity jurisdiction," the
goal of which, according to the court, is to bring order and consistency
to the development of state substantive law.83 The Factors court's view
of the possibility that federal courts might render incorrect interpreta-
tions of state law that are not reviewable by a state court as a "price
[that] must be paid. .. [a]s long as diversity jurisdiction exists" 84 dem-
onstrates the court's disregard of the basic Erie tenet that a federal
court sitting in diversity is to interpret state law as would a state court
in the same situation.
In an ideal system, both intercircuit and federal-state uniformity
could be achieved at once; all federal courts would agree on the correct
interpretation of a particular state law issue. When a federal court dis-
agrees with or questions the interpretation of a pertinent circuit court,
however, one kind of uniformity must be sacrificed. By deferring to the
Sixth Circuit interpretation on grounds totally unrelated to the Sixth
Circuit's expertise, the Factors court clearly chose to pursue intercirciit
small percentage of its business, is not likely to gain any special familiarity with the law
of one of the states within its boundaries.
652 F.2d at 285 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Cf. Note, supra note 29, at 756 ("Certainly a federal
district judge may be required to deal with the law of his state more frequently than federal circuit
court judges whose circuit includes many states, yet this fact alone does not make him more expert
in the field.").
82. See 652 F.2d at 286 (Mansfield, i., dissenting).
83. Id. at 282-83. The majority stated. "Diversity jurisdiction, especially in its post-Erie
incarnation, should not create needless diversity in the exposition of state substantive law." Id at
283. The opinion's heavy emphasis on the "orderly" and "authoritative" exposition of state law
and the rigid standard of deference which the opinion sets forth illuminate the court's apparent
view that any amount of diverseness in the federal adjudication of state law is "needless." Id.
84. The majority noted:
Except in those few jurisdictions permitting a federal court to certify an unsettled ques-
tion of state law to the state's highest court, a federal court's decision on state law cannot
be corrected for the benefit of the litigants in the particular case by the state's authorita-
tive tribunal. As long as diversity jurisdiction exists, this price must be paid.
Id. at 282.
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uniformity at the expense of federal-state uniformity, giving rise to the
dissent's admonition that "[s]oundness must not be sacrificed on the
altar of consistency."' 5
The Factors court's pursuit of consistency in federal court inter-
pretation of state law threatens to undermine what the Supreme Court
has termed the "twin aims" of the Erie doctrine: "discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws."8 6 Factors creates the same potential for forum-shopping that
Field created in requiring federal judges to follow all lower state court
decisions.8 7 For example, once a pertinent federal court of appeals de-
cides an unsettled question of state law, a litigant is virtually assured of
achieving that same outcome in any federal court in the nation. Con-
versely, a litigant who seeks an outcome contrary to a pertinent circuit
court decision will surely choose a state forum in which the federal
court decision is not binding.
The Factors rule could also lead to inequities in the administration
of state law. Under Factors, once a pertinent circuit court has rendered
an interpretation of an issue of state law, a federal court may not there-
after give the same full consideration to the merits of that issue as may
a state court.88 This discrepancy in the scope of authority that federal
and state courts possess in evaluating pertinent circuit court interpreta-
tions under the Factors rule impedes the equitable administration of
the law in two ways. First, litigants in federal court do not receive the
benefit of the flexibility that a state court exercises in evaluating a perti-
nent circuit court interpretation of state law. The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit recognized in an analogous context the impact that
"mechanical" federal court deference to unauthoritative state law inter-
pretations can have on diversity litigants:
A diversity litigant should not be drawn to the federal forum by the
prospect of a more favorable outcome than he could expect in the
state courts. But neither should he be penalized for his choice of the
federal court by being deprived of the flexibility that a state court
could reasonably expect to show.8 9
85. Id. at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
86. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965). The Court in Hanna stated that "Ithe 'out-
come-determination' test [of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)]. . . cannot be read
without reference to the twin aims of the Eie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the laws." 380 U.S. at 468. Hanna'r modification of the
York test demonstrates the Court's view that absolute uniformity should not be an end in itself.
87. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 29.
89. Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d Cir. 1978). The issue in Becker
was whether an employer was liable for the tort of an independent contractor under New Jersey
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The Factors rule imposes just such a penalty on diversity litigants. In
some cases, the penalty may consist of the federal court's application of
the incorrect state law interpretation.
The Factors policy of deference also impedes the equitable admin-
istration of state law by increasing the risk that obsolete 90 or incorrect
determinations of state law by pertinent circuit courts will be perpetu-
ated in the federal courts until contradicted or overruled by the state
supreme court.91 Given the Factors court's view that federal court in-
terpretations of state law are not easily corrected by a state's highest
court or legislature,92 it is ironic that the court set forth a policy of
deference that could extend the impact of an incorrect interpretation by
a pertinent circuit court to all of the federal courts of appeals.
The equitable administration of state law is best achieved when a
federal court considers all available data, from both the law of a state
and the law of other jurisdictions, and then predicts how the state court
would have decided the issue. Such a prediction should not be a mere
recitation of a prior decision that a state court would not deem control-
ling.93 By mandating rigid uniformity in the federal courts based on a
single federal court's interpretation of state law at a given time, the
Factors policy of deference does not advance the broader purposes of
Erie, but rather undermines them.
The third drawback to the Factors rule of conclusive deference is
that it will not significantly reduce the number of divergent outcomes
that traditionally result from the federal courts' interpretations of un-
settled state law. Even if the arbitrary nature and inequitable effects of
law. There were no New Jersey cases on point, but there were recent dicta that brought into
question the traditional doctrine of employer immunity for the acts of independent contractors.
The court noted its obligation to render a prediction of what a New Jersey court would do if faced
with the question: "In the course of discharging our obligation, we must choose either to reject or
to accept a nascent legal rule, and thus risk distorting state law as much by an excess of conserva-
tism as by insufficient attention to stare decisis:' Id. at 1204. The Becker court noted that the
trend in the New Jersey courts was away from employer immunity, and concluded that the New
Jersey courts would have held the employer liable under a new exception. Id at 1214.
90. Doctrinal trends in state law that occur after a pertinent federal circuit court's decision
could dictate a different outcome from that previously reached, were a state court to address the
issue. Under the Factors standard, however, such trends would not constitute evidence sufficient
to justify a federal court's departure from the pertinent federal circuit court's interpretation. See
supra note 76.
91. The Factors court's application of the Memphis Development court's view of the
descendibility question exemplifies how under a policy of conclusive deference an essentially in-
correct federal court interpretation of state law could be perpetuated within the federal courts
until contradicted by an authoritative state court decision. See infra text accompanying notes 125-
27.
92. See 652 F.2d at 282-83 & n.6.
93. See Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203, 1206 (3d Cir. 1978).
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the Factors rule could be justified by a compelling need to attain order
and consistency in federal court interpretation of state law, the Factors
rule would not satisfy such a need. As Judge Mansfield observed in his
dissent, whatever uniformity might be achieved in the federal courts
would be "fortuitous and arbitrary"; federal courts would still be free
to disregard interpretations of state law by federal courts of appeals
other than the pertinent circuit, and thus "create the very inconsistency
which the majority seeks to avoid."'94
The Factors majority's contention that a policy of deference to
pertinent federal circuit court interpretations would promote the "or-
derly development of state law" is based on several speculative and
perhaps ill-founded assumptions. The majority's theory that the exist-
ence of a single, "authoritative" interpretation of unsettled state law by
the pertinent court of appeals would "focus state legislative efforts on
the appropriateness of a statutory change" 95 seems no more persuasive
than the dissent's suggestion that a state legislature would be more
likely to act in the presence of conflicting federal court interpreta-
tions.96 In addition, the Factors court made the unwarranted assump-
tion that the uniform application of a particular state's law in the
federal courts would prompt other state courts applying the same
state's law to accept the federal interpretation out of a common interest
in uniformity.97 Historically, state courts have tended not to follow
federal court interpretations of state law;98 more often, they have
looked to decisions from neighboring states.99
94. 652 F.2d at 286 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 282. It is ironic that under the majority's theory, federal courts would need to
apply an incorrect interpretation consistently in order to prompt corrective action by a state's
legislature.
96. In his dissent, Judge Mansfield countered the majority's proposition as follows: "If Ten-
nessee constituents were laboring under conflicting federal court declarations of rights and duties,
the legislature would be more likely to act sooner than if all decisions were consistent." 652 F.2d
at 286.
97. Id. at 282 n.6.
98. A basic premise of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), see supra
note 3, was that independent determinations of general law by federal courts would be followed
by the states, promoting uniformity in the law. History shows that this premise was faulty: the
Swift doctrine was gradually narrowed until it was repudiated entirely by the Erie decision. See
C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 56, at 261; see also Note, The Effect of Diversify Jurisdiction on State
Litigation, 40 IND. L.J. 566, 584 (1965) (comprehensive study examining all diversity cases in
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit from 1938-1963 showed no state tendency to follow
federal court interpretations of state law).
99. See, eg., Yost v. Morrow, 262 F.2d 826, 828 n.3 (2d Cir. 1959) (in situation in which no
Idaho conflict of laws statute existed, court assumed Idaho court would look to decisions of its
sister state, Oregon); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 76 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D. Del.
1948) (taking legal notice that Delaware courts pay particular attention to Massachusetts court
decisions).
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The clearly unpersuasive nature of the arguments set forth by the
Factors majority to support its policy of intercircuit deference indicates
that the real force behind the holding may have been an unspoken de-
sire to promote judicial economy. But the Factors form of deference
would fail to promote judicial economy for the same reason that it
would not bring about greater horizontal uniformity in the application
of unsettled state law in the federal courts: the impact of the Factors
rule is limited to cases in which apertinent circuit court interprets an
unsettled question of state law.t°° Under Factors such an interpreta-
tion by a federal court other than the pertinent circuit court would re-
quire no deference from federal courts in other circuits.
In order to have a perceptible impact on the diversity workload in
the federal courts, a policy of intercircuit deference would have to man-
date deference to all circuit court interpretations of unsettled state law,
not merely those of the pertinent circuit. By failing to base its holding
on the rationale of a pertinent circuit court's expertise and at the same
time limiting its requirement of deference to pertinent circuit court de-
cisions, the Factors court sacrificed the soundness of interpretation ar-
guably implicit in a policy of deference based on expertise without
gaming any more than a nominal increase in either horizontal uniform-
ity or judicial efficiency.
The fourth major flaw in the Factors approach is that the standard
employed by the court overly restricts the extent to which the deferring
court may examine relevant law. Under the Factors rule, federal courts
are bound to follow an interpretation of state law by the pertinent fed-
eral circuit court unless there is a clear showing from a state supreme
court decision that a state court would hold to the contrary.'01 This
standard, when applied to a pertinent federal circuit court's interpreta-
tion of a state law question that has not been addressed by any state
court, necessarily requires "conclusive deference."' 0 2 For example, in
Factors, there was no Tennessee law that the court could consult on the
question at issue. As a result, the Second Circuit considered itself
bound by the Sixth Circuit's interpretation even though there was evi-
dence outside-of Tennessee law, including the reversed federal district
100. See supra text accompanying note 94.
101. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
102. Professor Wrights criticism of the "conclusive deference" that some federal courts have
afforded lower state court decisions seems equally valid in the Factors context: "It would seem
that a party is entitled to review the trial court's determination of state law just as he is of any
other legal question in the case, and that the decision of the local trial judge cannot reasonably be
regarded as conclusive." C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 58, at 271.
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court decision, that the Sixth Circuit may have decided the issue
incorrectly. 10 3
The Factors standard is thus stricter than the "clearly erroneous"
standard that some federal courts of appeals employ when reviewing
district court interpretations of state law, t1 4 and far more inflexible
than the "great weight"' 105 standard that most courts and commentators
have favored. 10 6 Commentators have criticized the "clearly erroneous"
standard as "treating the question of state law much as if it were a
question of fact."' 0 7 The same objection applies to the Factors stan-
dard, which requires a firm conviction that the pertinent circuit court
has disregarded a clear indication from a state supreme court decision
supporting a contrary interpretation.108
The Factors standard of deference is especially harsh because it
requires deference not to a district judge's state law interpretation on
appeal, but rather to a decision rendered in a completely different law-
103. There is ample case law and commentary supporting the proposition that the right of
publicity is descendible. See, e.g., Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979) ("Factors I"); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.NJ. 1981); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors, Etc., Inc.
v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Price v. Hal Roach Studies, Inc., 400 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the fight of Publicity:
Is There Commercial Lffe After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980).
104. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Whereas a federal court of appeals' applica-
tion of the "clearly erroneous" standard jeopardizes the right of diversity litigants to have a fed-
eral district court's interpretation of state law fully reviewed on appeal, the Factors standard of
intercircuit deference would preclude litigants from receiving full consideration of their claims at
any stage of the action.
105. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
106. See J. MOORE, supra note 21, 0.309 [2], at 3125.
107. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 58, at 271. There is indeed a danger in using the same
standard of review for a federal district court's interpretation of state law as is used for a finding of
fact. The fact-finding function has traditionally been within the province of the trial court. Con-
sequently, such findings are accepted on review unless found to be clearly erroneous. The func-
tion of interpreting law, on the other hand, is one that is not appropriately conducted by any
single court. To be sure, some judges possess characteristics that may render them better suited
than others to make certain kinds of legal determinations; it is for this reason that rules of defer-
ence exist. But the difference in various judges' ability to interpret the law is one 6f degree rather
than kind; thus, a standard of review as preclusive as the "clearly erroneous" standard is not
appropriate for findings of law. One commentator's criticism of the Field Court's apparent reli-
ance on Erie to support its rule of strict deference to lower state court decisions also seem relevant
in light of Factors:
mhe very essence of the Erie doctrine is that a federal judge can find, if not make, the
law almost as well as a state judge. Certainly, if the law is not a brooding omnipresence
in the sky over the United States, neither is it a brooding omnipresence in the sky of
Vermont, or New York or California. The bases of state law are assumed to be commu-
nicable by lawyers to judges, federal judges no less than state judges.
Kurland, supra note 16, at 217.
108. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. When there is no state law on the question at
issue, a federal court must follow a pertinent circuit court's interpretation even when all data
outside state law indicate that the pertinent circuit court holding is incorrect.
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suit by a federal court in another circuit. Indeed, such deference could
foreclose the rights of litigants who were not parties to the original case.
The binding nature of pertinent circuit court decisions would thus ex-
tend beyond that of the doctrine of stare decisis, under which courts are
generally free to overrule a prior decision if it is obsolete or incor-
rect,10 9 and would in effect carry the force of res judicata.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR REASONED DEFERENCE
The factual situation in Factors was clearly not conducive to the
Second Circuit's articulation of a policy of deference among federal
courts of appeals. The Sixth Circuit's express disregard of Tennessee
law in Memphis Development,10 coupled with its reversal of the federal
district judge's decision,II prevented the Factors court from making
use of the most compelling rationale for a policy of deference-that of
expertness.' 12 The Factors court added to its problems by seeking to
achieve uniformity of state law among the federal courts at the expense
of broader Erie concerns,"n3 and by constructing an inflexible standard
of deference. 114
Despite the weaknesses in the Factors decision, the basic concept
of establishing some degree of formal deference among federal courts
sitting in diversity does merit consideration. The Factors court was not
mistaken in its observatiQn that some "needless diversity" exists in the
exposition of state law.115 The court merely erred in its apparent belief
that all such diverseness is unnecessary and must be eliminated, regard-
less of cost.116 The federal system of diversity jurisdiction could benefit
from a rule of reasoned deference that would both promote federal-
state uniformity of state law and frequently produce the desirable side
effect of uniformity of state law among the federal courts.'17 A worka-
109. Professor Moore states that under the doctrine of stare decisis a prior federal court of
appeals decision is generally regarded as "persuasive" in a subsequent case in the same circuit.
See J. MOORE, supra note 21, § 0.309[2], at 3125. Moore also notes, however, that in some circuits,
such as the Fifth Circuit, such decisions are controlling unless the court overturns the decision
sitting en banc. Id & n.25.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63 and note 73.
111. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the problems inherent in a policy mandating rigid adherence to state
law interpretations of courts other than the state supreme court, see supra text accompanying notes
21-29 and 78-109.
117. A formal policy of deference to pertinent circuit court interpretations of unsettled state
law would be especially helpful in light of the fact that many states do not have statutes allowing
federal courts to certify undecided questions of state law to the state's highest court.
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ble policy of intercircuit deference must differ from the Factors policy,
however, in at least two respects. First, a sound rule of deference must
be grounded on considerations of expertness and of proper inquiry into
state law and state court methods.118 To merit deference, a pertinent
circuit court's holding must have been based on a well-reasoned predic-
tion, rendered by either the pertinent circuit or the federal district judge
below, of how a state court would have decided the issue.119
Certification procedures are provided for by statute or court rules in several states, including
Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Washington. See, e.g., COLO. App. R. 21.1 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.031 (West 1974); LA. Sup. CT. R. 12 (West Supp. 1982); Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 57
(1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-601 (1980); MAss. Sup. JuD. CT. R. 1:03 (1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 480.061 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. Sup. CT. R. 1 (1973); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 480.061
(Vest Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1612 (West. Supp. 1982); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 2.60 (West Supp. 1982). The Supreme Court endorsed the certification procedure in Leh-
man Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974), noting that "in the long run [it saves] time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Id. at 391 (footnote omitted). Many
commentators have enthusiastically supported the certification procedure. See, e.g., Kurland, To-
ward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481
(1960); Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Cert/fication of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 888 (1971); McKusick, Cert#Fcatio: A Procedurefor Cooperation Between State and Fed-
eral Courts, 16 Ma. L. REv. 33 (1964). Other commentators, however, point out that the expense
and delay caused by the procedure, as well as its inherently "advisory" nature, may make it an
undesirable innovation. See, eg., C. WRioHT, supra note 1, § 52, at 226-27; Cardozo, Choosing
and Declaring State Law: Deference to State Courts Versus Federal Jesponstbillt,, 55 Nw. U. L.
REv. 519 (1960); Mattis, Certfcation of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 717 (1969).
Because federal court certification of unsettled state law questions to state supreme courts is
not mandatory and may cause considerable delay, federal courts may in some cases choose to
defer to a well-reasoned interpretation of the issue by a pertinent circuit, even when a certification
procedure is available. Thus, the existence of certification procedures does not eliminate the need
for a policy of deference among the federal courts.
118. In Becker v. Interstate Properties, 569 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1977), the Third Circuit de-
clined to defer to an interpretation of Delaware law by a district judge who had based his ruling
on factors outside of state law. The court stated:
We have taken serious notice of the determination by the trial court that New Jersey
would not adopt the position which we set forth. Judge Fisher's views, of course as a
member of the New Jersey bar with long experience are entitled to great weight. None-
theless, since his analysis rested solely on general policy and out-of-state cases, we do not
believe the trial judge's views bind us.
Id. at 1206 n.8.
Had the district judge in Becker based his interpretation of Delaware state law on considera-
tions within the realm of his particular expertise, the Third Circuit probably would not have felt as
free to differ with the initial interpretation. Unlike the Becker court, the Factors court expressed
no concern that the Sixth Circuit's holding in Memphis Development did not merit deference be-
cause it was based entirely on considerations of general policy and not state law.
119. Most courts now employ such a prediction procedure in deciding issues of unsettled state
law. The Third Circuit has identified the following sources to be used in predicting the course of
state law: decisions by the state's highest court in analogous cases; considered dicta of the state
supreme court; decisions by lower state courts and other federal courts, which should be afforded
"proper regard" but not conclusive effect; and any other reliable data indicating how the state's
highest court would decide the issue at hand. See, ag., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wetherill,
725
726 DUKE LAW JOURN4L [Vol. 1982:704
Second, a rule of reasoned deference must permit federal courts to
reject pertinent circuit court interpretations that are obsolete or incor-
rect.120 The Factors decision itself demonstrates that neither the pur-
poses of the Erie doctrine nor the function of diversity jurisdiction is
served by a system that allows a federal court to decide novel questions
of state law on grounds entirely independent of state law, and also
binds all other federal courts to follow that interpretation unless they
can clearly show from state law that it is incorrect.
In practical terms, a flexible rule of.deference might require a fed-
eral court first to make a threshold determination whether the pertinent
circuit court did make an inquiry into state law or state court procedure
in an attempt to predict how a state court would have decided the ques-
tio. -If-no such inquiry was made, the federal court should not defer to
the pertinent circuit court's decision.12' If the pertinent circuit court
622 F.2d 685, 688 (3d Cir. 1980); McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980). In short, a federal court's prediction should be the result of
an inquiry into sources to which a state court would normally turn for guidance on questions of
first impression. Although this method does not eliminate the possibility that federal courts will
make erroneous interpretations, it is more likely to produce the result that a state court would
reach, and thus promote Erie uniformity, than would interpretations based on a federal judge's
independent judgment or on a mechanical application of unauthoritative existing law. See Note,
Federal Interpretation of State Law-An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquir,, 53 MINN. L.
REv. 806, 816-17 (1969).
120. In Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wetherill, 622 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1980), the court declined
to defer to an intermediate state court decision that it believed was incorrectly decided, stating
that it was "not obliged to give any such source more precedential value than would be given to it
by the state's highest court." Id. at 688. The court explained that
while a decision of Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court would be entitled to
"some weight", it is difficult to accord the. . . decision such weight because it provides
us with no analysis. Furthermore, it cites as support three Pennsylvania decisions which
we are unable to read as, in fact, supportive of the result.
Id. at 689 (citations omitted).
In McKena v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.), ceri. denied, 449 U.S. 976
(1980), the Third Circuit declined to follow an analogous nine-year-old state supreme court deci-
sion that had never been expressly overruled but whose authoritativeness on the question at issue
was arguable. The court stated that although analogous decisions by a state supreme court pro-
vide useful indications of that court's probable disposition of a question of unsettled state law, a
federal court's prediction could not be the product of a mere recitation of previously decided
cases. The court noted that federal courts should not give state court decisions more binding effect
than would a state court under the same circumstances. "Rather, relevant state precedents must be
scrutinized with an eye toward the broad policies that informed those adjudications, and to the
doctrinal trends which they evince." Id. at 662.
It would hardly make sense if federal courts were free to disregard lower state court decisions
that they deemed obsolete or incorrect-on grounds that such decisions would not be binding on a
state court in the same circumstances-but at the same time were bound to defer to pertinent
federal circuit court decisions that would not be binding on a state court. Federal courts should
adopt the same approach in reviewing pertinent circuit or district court decisions as they have
employed when evaluating lower state court decisions or federal district court interpretations of
state law on appeal, namely, one of reasoned deference and not blind adherence.
121. See supra note 118.
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made a reasonable effort to inquire into state law, or deferred to a well-
grounded prediction by a federal district court judge, a federal court
should then give "great weight" to the holding.122 Under this standard
of deference, a federal court would regard an adequately grounded per-
tinent circuit court interpretation of state law as highly persuasive, and
would defer to the holding unless convinced that the pertinent circuit
had erred.'2 3
In addition, unlike the Factors rule, the proposed policy of defer-
ence would permit a federal court to examine the same breadth of data
that the pertinent circuit court consulted in rendering its interpretation.
This is not to say that federal courts should engage in a detailed review
of all of the pertinent circuit court's conclusions. To the extent that a
pertinent circuit court is free to render a prediction based on sources
outside a state's law, however, other federal courts must be allowed a
scope of review sufficiently broad to permit disagreement with that pre-
diction when it is clearly ill-founded.' 24
A rule of deference considerably more flexible than that of Factors
would be desirable for several reasons. First, such a rule would avoid
perpetuating obsolete or incorrect interpretations of state law within
the federal court system. Significantly, the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Memphis Development has recently been contradicted by a Tennessee
chancery court holding 25 and thus may not warrant deference even
122. Because the proposed rule of deference is grounded on considerations of expertise, unap-
pealed decisions by district judges would merit a comparable degree of deference.
123. Review of a pertinent circuit court's interpretation by a federal court subsequently faced
with the same issue would thus be a two-step procedure. The first step would be to examine the
methods by which the pertinent circuit court had reached its decision and to determine whether
some amount of deference should be afforded the interpretation. The second step, if needed,
would be to evaluate the merits of the pertinent circuit court's decision under the "great weight"
standard of deference.
Conceivably, the amount of weight given a pertinent circuit court decision might vary accord-
ing to factors such as whether the court of appeals' opinion reversed or affirmed the district judge's
interpretation and whether the state law issue decided was one uniquely local in nature or in-
volved a more common subject area such as the Uniform Commercial Code, with which most
federal judges are familiar. For example, pertinent circuit court decisions that reverse interpreta-
tions of state law by district court judges, as did the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Develop-
ment, would be afforded little or no deference. At the same time, when both a federal district
judge and the pertinent court of appeals render the same prediction of state law, such an interpre-
tation is likely to be accurate and would be afforded substantial deference. This distinction is
consistent with the notion that expertise is at the root of the rule of deference. -
124. A broad scope of review is imperative for obvious reasons. Cases that turn on state law
questions on which there is no existing state law, such as Factors, necessarily oblige a federal court
to look to sources outside state law. Review of such decisions is rendered virtually meaningless
when other federal courts may evaluate the pertinent circuit's interpretation based only on factors
within state law.
125. A Tennessee chancery court judge recently considered the issue of whether an enter-
tainer's right of publicity is descendible, and reached a result directly contrary to that of the Sixth
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within the Sixth and Second Circuits.12 6 Ordinarily, however, state
courts cannot be expected to rectify ill-founded interpretations of state
Circuit in Memphis Development and the Second Circuit in Factors. See Commerce Union Bank
v. Coors, MEDIA L. RE'. (BNA) 2204 (Tenn. Ch.). Citing two analogous state court decisions on
which the federal district judge had relied in Memphis Development, decisions in other jurisdic-
tions, and Judge Mansfield's dissent in Factors, the chancery court judge held that the right of
publicity is descendible under Tennessee law. The chancery court opinion, rendered on a motion
to dismiss, expressly contradicted the Sixth Circuit's holding in Memphis Development:
The Sixth Circuit's opinion in Memphis Development is irreconcilable with this
Court's decision that the right of publicity is descendible and the majority view on this
issue. Understandably, the defendant emphasises, [the Sixth Circuit's opinion], an em-
phasis not misplaced since the Sixth Circuit was attempting to apply Tennessee law. Of
course, that federal court decision is not binding on this Court, just as the district court's
decision in the same case which held the opposite is not binding. This Court, however,
finds the reasoning of the district court more persuasive than that of the appellate court.
Id. at 2207.
Had the court in Factors followed the Erie directive and predicted how a state court would
decide the issue instead of blindly following the Sixth Circuit's interpretation, it might also have
reached the conclusion that the district judge's reasoning was more persuasive than that of the
circuit court.
The chancery court opinion quoted extensively from the portions of Judge Mansfield's dissent
in Factors that pointed out that the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Memphis Development was in no
way derived from Tennessee law. In addition, the chancery court judge dismissed the Second
Circuit's decision in Factors as follows: "The Second Circuit followed the Sixth Circuit not be-
cause it agreed with the holding on the merits, but because it felt that it was bound to do so
because Tennessee is within the Sixth Circuit." Id. at 2207-08. Finally, the court noted that the
right of publicity should be descendible not only because judicial precedent and considerations of
fundamental fairness and property interest support descendibility, but also because public policy
dictates that the efforts and energies of Tennessee artists be protected. Id. at 2208 (citing Factors,
652 F.2d at 288 (Mansfield, J., dissenting)).
126. Although it is questionable whether federal or state courts outside the Sixth and Second
Circuits would have deferred to the interpretation of the court in Memphis Development, courts
will now be even less likely to follow Memphis Development without first making an independent
determination of the issue on the merits. Technically, the decision in Memphis Development could
remain "good law" until the Supreme Court of Tennessee renders a contrary interpretation. The
chancery court's opinion in Commerce Union Bank v. Coors clearly casts doubt on the validity of
the Sixth Circuit's decision in Memphis Development, however, particularly because the reasoning
of the chancery court opinion is much more developed than is the rationale in Memphis Develop-
ment. It has not yet been determined whether the Factors court's holding regarding the
descendibility of the right of publicity under Tennessee law remains valid after the Commerce
Union Bank decision. See supra note 53. In his opinion staying entry of judgment in Factors
Federal District Court Judge Tenney stated that under Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co.,
311 U.S. 538, 543 (1941), "[a] federal court sitting in diversity has a duty to apply a new rule of
state law that relates to an action sub judice." 541 F. Supp. 231, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Regardless of the outcome of the descendibility question in Factors, the deference aspect of
the holding will apparently continue to carry force within the Second Circuit, and was recently
followed in a decision by the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. In
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 539 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court
cited Factors in deferring to a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on a question
of first impression under California law. In Alcan Aluminum, a foreign parent corporation sued
the California Franchise Tax Board, challenging the Tax Board's inclusion of income from for-
eign corporations in its calculation of unitary income tax. The Tax Board argued that the plain-
tifes action in federal court was barred by the federal Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1976), because a remedy was available to the plaintiffs domestic taxpaying subsidiary in Califor-
nia court.
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law by federal courts. As the majority in Factors noted, there may be
"an extended period" before the state supreme court addresses the
identical issue.127 Nor can the United States Supreme Court be relied
on to correct a pertinent circuit court holding because it has repeatedly
signaled a reluctance to review lower federal court interpretations of
state law.128 Finally, state legislatures are often neither well-suited nor
inclined to fill gaps in the law left by the judiciary.
A second factor that favors a more flexible rule of deference is that
such a rule would not overly restrict federal judges in ascertaining un-
settled state law.129 Presumably, the role played by federal judges sit-
ting in diversity would be no less diminished by the Factors
requirement of rigid adherence to the state law interpretations of other
courts of appeals than it was by the Field decision's call for a mechani-
cal application of intermediate state court decisions. 130 It indeed would
be an ironic result if the federal courts, after gradually regaining the
The court rejected the defendant's contention and granted jurisdiction, deferring to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Capital Industries-EML, Inc., v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 102 S.Ct. 1438 (1982), that section 1341 of the statute did not bar such a claim in federal
court because the interests of the parent and subsidiary were not necessarily identical. Signifi-
cantly, the 1can Aluminum court deferred to the Ninth Circuit determination despite its own
doubts that "the parent and subsidiary's interests [were] not so similar that the subsidiary's action
[in California court] would determine the claims of both parties... :' 539 F. Supp. at 514-15.
The court stated that "[a]s California is in the Ninth Circuit, that Court is in a better position to
decide this issue of state law .. " Id at 515.
127. See 652 F.2d at 282-83 & n.6.
128. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47 & n.10 (1976). In Bishop the Court held that a
district court's "tenable" interpretation of a state statute, upheld by a divided court of appeals, was
sufficient to foreclose the Court's independent examination of the state law issue. The Court
stated that it had in the past "accepted the interpretation of state law in which the District Court
and the Court of Appeals have concurred even if an examination of the state-law issue without
such guidance might have justified a different conclusion.' .d. at 346 (footnote omitted); see also
United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1960); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472,486-87 (1949); MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942). One
commentator observed: "The real reason for the Supreme Court to bow, and it usually does, to
the decisions on state law of the lower federal courts rests not on the premise of expertness but on
one of economy ofjudicial administration." Kurland, supra note 16, at 217. See also Note, supra
note 29, at 756 ("By leaving the final responsibility for ascertaining state law to the lower federal
courts, the Supreme Court is, pro tanto, in a better position to adjudicate those great issues of
government which by their very nature require its consideration.").
129. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
130. It could be argued that federal judges would be less offended by a rule that required rigid
deference to the decisions of fellow federal judges, particularly because each federal court of ap-
peals would take comfort in knowing that its decisions on unsettled questions of the law of states
within its circuit would be binding on all other federal courts. Such knowlege, however, would
not allay federal judges' concern that they might be forced to "abdicate [their] judicial functions,"
when faced with questions of unsettled state law that had been interpreted by other pertinent
courts of appeals. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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authority to exercise some discretion in interpreting unsettled state law,
voluntarily reverted to a new form of "mechanical jurisprudence" by
adopting the rule set forth in Factors.
A third consideration in support of a more measured rule of defer-
ence is the unprecedented nature of the proposition that a federal cir-
cuit court should regard a decision from another circuit as binding.
Federal court deference to interpretations of state law by other federal
courts has heretofore been applied only vertically, with courts of ap-
peals deferring to district courts within a given circuit.' 3' The notion
that such a policy could also be employed horizontally, among the
courts of different circuits, involves the additional concern of circuit
court autonomy 132 and thus should be proposed with considerably
more care and moderation than was exercised by the court in Factors.
A fourth reason that commends a more flexible policy of deference
is that such a policy would better enable a federal court evaluating a
prior interpretation of state law to simulate the procedural posture of a
state court. A state court is not bound by a pertinent circuit court's
holding on an issue of its own state law, and is not prohibited from
considering sources outside of state law in evaluating such a holding. 133
The proposed rule of deference, unlike the Factors rule, would allow a
federal court evaluating a pertinent circuit court decision to exercise the
same flexibility as would a state court, thereby increasing the likelihood
that the correct state substantive law would be applied. 34
In sum, the fundamental advantage of a rule of reasoned defer-
ence is that it would both provide the federal court litigant with the
benefit of the same expertise-to the extent that it exists in the pertinent
circuit court--that he would receive were he before a state court, and
preserve for the litigant the right to have his claim considered as fully
as it would have been in a state court. One policy that a flexible rule of
131. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
132. Aside from the Eighth Circuits attempt to promote uniformity of federal law by defer-
ring to the decisions of other courts of appeals, the federal courts of appeals have generally shown
little willingness to follow the decisions of their sister circuits, even on matters of first impression.
See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
133. This principle was demonstrated in the recent Tennessee chancery court holding in Com-
merce Union Bank v. Coors, 7 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 2204 (Tenn. Ch. 1981). In Commerce Union
Bank the chancery court judge contradicted the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the descendibility
question under Tennessee law, siding instead with the position adopted by federal district courts
in New York and New Jersey. Although the Factors majority acknowledged in a footnote that no
state court would be bound by a pertinent circuit court interpretation of state law, the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the Erie doctrine as allowing the Sixth Circuit to authoritatively "de-
clare the law of Tennessee," see 652 F.2d at 281, would give pertinent circuit court decisions a
force exceeded only by a state supreme court ruling.
134. See supra notes 88-93 & 101-09 and accompanying text.
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deference would not facilitate is that of judicial economy within the
federal courts. A rule of reasoned deference might require a considera-
ble expenditure of time and effort by the federal judge,' 35 especially
because the "prediction method" of ascertaining unsettled state law has
become more prevalent in the federal courts. 136 But given that the Fac-
tors standard of deference would ultimately thwart the policies under-
lying Erie137 while only nominally promoting judicial economy 138 and
that the only alternative-no deference at all--consumes at least as-
much judicial time and energy without providing the benefit of perti-
nent district and circuit court expertise, a policy of reasoned deference
is certainly worth pursuing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the impact of Erie and its progeny, a federal court's task of
ascertaining unsettled state law in diversity cases is no easier today
than it was a half century ago. Depending on whether a federal court
chooses to decide an unsettled question of state law by deferring to a
prior interpretation by another federal court or by rendering its own
prediction of how a state court would decide the issue, it will often be
accused of either abdicating its judicial function at the expense of di-
versity litigants or thwarting uniformity of state law.
The Supreme Court's attempt forty years ago in Field to promote
uniformity of state law by requiring federal courts to defer to virtually
all lower state court decisions produced inequitable results in federal
diversity cases.' 39 As a result, the Supreme Court has since adopted an
135. One commentator has argued that the federal interest in administrative efficiency merits
due regard under the Erie doctrine, and thus might be relevant in determining how extensively a
federal judge must examine the state judicial process. See Note, supra note 119, at 825. This
argument stems from the Supreme Court's decisions in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), and
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), in which the Court faced the
separate issue of whether a state rule of law was substantive or procedural.
136. See supra notes 121-24 for a discussion of the process of first determining whether a
pertinent circuit court has made a reasonable effort to predict how a state court would decide the
issue and then evaluating the prediction itself. There is little doubt that the prediction procedure
consumes more judicial resources than does an independent judgment rendered by a federal court.
See Note, supra note 117, at 820; see also Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality
of the State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 322 (1967) ("lI]t is easier to make good law than success-
fully to predict how it will be made.").
Were a federal court to evaluate a pertinent circuit court's prediction, it would probably ex-
pend less time than if it were to render a prediction itself, but more time than would be required
under the Factors rule.
137. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
138. See supra text following note 99.
139. See supra notes 28-29 and'accompanying text.
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approach that allows federal courts greater scope to interpret unde-
cided questions of state law.140
The Second Circuit attempted to establish a formal policy of def-
erence among circuit courts in Factors, but was unsuccessful for several
reasons. The Factors court, constrained by the facts of the case before
it, was forced to base its holding that pertinent circuit court interpreta-
tions of unclear state law are generally conclusive on an arbitrary geo-
graphical, distinction rather than on the premise of expertness. 141 In
addition, the rigid standard of deference set forth in Factors mandates,
rather than encourages, adherence to pertinent circuit court interpreta-
tions, thereby leaving other federal courts virtually no authority to dif-
fer with obsolete or questionable holdings. 42 Perhaps most important,
the Factors decision pursues the goal of uniformity of state law among
the federal courts of appeals at the expense of federal-state uniformity,
ignoring the broader Erie objectives of deterring forum-shopping and
encouraging the equitable administration of the law.' 43 In short, the
Factors rule of deference is in reality one of blind adherence: arbi-
trary, unbending, and potentially inequitable. As such, it will fare no
better in the 1980s than did the Field rule forty years before.
Federal courts would be wise to consider adopting a rule of defer-
ence that is based on the special knowledge that federal courts
throughout the nation possess with respect to the laws of particular
states. Such a rule would enable federal judges to benefit from the ex-
pertise of their colleagues in other circuits while preserving their au-
thority to disregard aberrant or obsolete interpretations of state law by
other federal judges. A more measured rule of deference might even
succeed where Factors failed, striking a balance between the confficting
forces of equity and uniformity in the federal courts' ascertainment of
state law.
Craig 4. Hoover
140. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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